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~subject:"Market Design"
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Search: person:"Peter, Cramton"
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Market Design
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market design
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spectrum auctions
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Cramton, Peter
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Ausubel, Lawrence M.
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Milgrom, Paul
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Shoham, Yoav
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Steinberg, Richard
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Stoft, Steven
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University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton
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1
How Best to Auction Oil Rights
Cramton, Peter
-
University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter …
-
2005
I study the design of oil rights auctions. A good auction design promotes both an efficient assignment of rights and competitive revenues for the seller. The structure of bidder preferences and the degree of competition are key factors in determining the best design. With weak competition and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004988775
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2
A Capacity Market that Makes Sense
Cramton, Peter
;
Stoft, Steven
-
University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter …
-
2005
We argue that a capacity market is needed in most restructured electricity markets, and present a design that avoids the many problems found in the early capacity markets. The proposed locational capacity market pays suppliers based on their demonstrated ability to supply energy or reserves in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004997810
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3
Competitive Bidding Behavior in Uniform-Price Auction Markets
Cramton, Peter
-
University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter …
-
2004
Profit-maximizing bidding in uniform price auction markets involves bidding above marginal cost. It therefore is not surprising that such behavior is observed in electricity markets. This incentive to bid above marginal cost is not the result of coordinated action among the bidders. Rather, each...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004988748
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4
Simultaneous Ascending Auction
Cramton, Peter
-
University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter …
-
2004
The simultaneous ascending auction has proved to be a successful method of auctioning many related items. Simultaneous sale and ascending bids enable price discovery, which helps bidders build desirable packages of items. Although package bids are not allowed, the auction format does handle mild...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004988767
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5
The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design
Cramton, Peter
;
Ausubel, Lawrence M.
;
Milgrom, Paul
-
University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter …
-
2004
We propose the clock-proxy auction as a practical means for auctioning many related items. A clock auction phase is followed by a last-and-final proxy round. The approach combines the simple and transparent price discovery of the clock auction with the efficiency of the proxy auction. Linear...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004988791
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6
Auctioning Many Divisible Goods
Cramton, Peter
;
Ausubel, Lawrence M.
-
University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter …
-
2004
We study the theory and practical implementation of auctioning many divisible goods. With multiple related goods, price discovery is important not only to reduce the winner’s curse, but more importantly, to simplify the bidder’s decision problem and to facilitate the revelation of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004988798
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7
Combinatorial Auctions
Cramton, Peter
;
Shoham, Yoav
;
Steinberg, Richard
-
University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter …
-
2004
Cantillon, Chris Caplice,
Peter
Cramton
, Andrew Davenport, George Donohue, Karla Hoffman, Gail Hohner, Jayant Kalagnanam, Ailsa …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004997796
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8
Electricity Market Design: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly
Cramton, Peter
-
University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter …
-
2003
This paper examines principles of market design as applied to electricity markets. I illustrate the principles with examples of both good and bad designs. I discuss one of the main design challenges—dealing with market power. I then discuss FERC’s choice of a standard market design.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004988755
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9
Rebuttal Addendum: Assessment of Submissions of the California Parties
Cramton, Peter
-
University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter …
-
2003
In light of my report "Competitive Bidding Behavior in Uniform Price Auction Markets" ("Competitive Bidding Behavior Report"), which is being separately filed in this proceeding, I have reviewed the testimony of Drs. Fox-Penner, Stern, Berry, and Reynolds on behalf of the California parties, and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004988762
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10
Competitive Bidding Behavior in Uniform-Price Auction Markets
Cramton, Peter
-
University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter …
-
2003
Profit-maximizing bidding in uniform price auction markets involves bidding above marginal cost. It therefore is not surprising that such behavior is observed in electricity markets. Common bidding behavior such as "hockey stick" bids easily are explained by suppliers determining their supply...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004988778
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