An economic elite wants to buy a public asset as cheaply as possible. Its ownership is decided by an incumbent politician who can be of high or low competence. The elite can make a buying offer for the asset and manipulate the information that is available to voters about the incumbent’s...

We study committees that acquire information, deliberate, and vote. A member cares about state-dependent decision payoffs and his reputation for expertise. The state remains unobserved. In such environments, members' internal reputations are based on deliberation patterns, while members'...

The purpose of this research is to evaluate the effect of issuing businesses engaging reputed law firms on the extent of underpricing in developing IPO markets. The consequences of involving prestigious lawyers in underpricing IPO businesses are not really understood from a global viewpoint due...

Earning a good reputation is crucial for the survival of new firms on online retailing and service platforms. With a dynamic price signaling model, we show that a high-quality firm can signal its unobserved quality by setting a lower introductory price than its low-quality counterpart. After...

We examine the effectiveness of a quality assurance mechanism that relies on a third-party’s reputation. We focus on the market for fine and rare wines where auction houses intermediating between sellers and buyers have also claimed expertise to assess product authenticity. An auction...

In a bargaining paradigm, we investigated the influence of reputational concern and monetary gain on generosity and deception. 141 schoolchildren aged between 7 to 12 participated in an ultimatum bargaining game. As proposers, they were asked to split a monetary resource with a hypothetical...

We use an adverse selection model to study the dynamics of firms reputations when firms implement joint projects. We show that in contrast with projects implemented by a single firm, in the case of joint projects a firm's reputation does not necessarily increase following a success and does not...

We study transparency and reputation in a stylized investment game in which two senders interact with a receiver in a linear network. We analyse how ex-ante information (compatible with receiver’s reputation building) and ex-post information (making the receiver’s decisions transparent) make...

We examine whether a company's corporate reputation gained from their CSR activities and a company leader's reputation, one that is unrelated to his or her business acumen, can impact economic action fairness appraisals. We provide experimental evidence that good corporate reputation causally...