Individuals often face financial incentives that challenge their desire to behave hon- estly. Strategically making excuses to justify dishonesty allows them to give in to the temptation of financial benefit and retain their moral self-image. In the context of insurance underwriting, the stakes...

We design and test a novel insurance advice mechanism aimed at promoting trust and cooperation in markets with asymmetric information. In a buyer-seller game, sellers are given the option to advise buyers on whether to purchase third-party insurance against the potential losses from the...

We design a novel insurance advice mechanism aimed at promoting trust and cooperation in markets with asymmetric information. In a buyer-seller game, sellers are given the option to advise buyers on whether to purchase third-party insurance against the potential losses from the opportunistic...

Redistribution is an inevitable feature of collective pension schemes. It is still largely an open question what people‘s preferences are regarding redistribution - both through pensions schemes as well as more generally. It would seem that economists have little to say about this question, as...

We experimentally investigate whether the procedural history of a sanctioning institution affects cooperation in a social dilemma. Subjects inherit the institutional setting from a previous generation of subjects who either decided on the implementation of the institution democratically by...

This paper studies experimentally how the endogeneity of sanctioning institutions affects the severity of punishment in social dilemmas. We allow individuals to vote on the introduction of third-party-administered sanctions, and compare situations in which the adoption of this institution is...