The notion of veto player was originally introduced in simple games [see Nakamura (1979)], for which every coalition has a value of 0 or 1. In this paper we extend it to monotonic cooperative games with transferable utility: a player has veto power if all coalitions not containing her are...

We construct a cross-section of stock prices and their corresponding present values of future cash flows. A regression of present value on the initial stock price should have a slope coefficient equal to 1.0. For short horizons, this is a cross-section version of checking the random walk model...

For the class of shortest path games, we propose a family of new cost sharing rules satisfying core selection. These rules allocate cost shares to the players according to some lexicographic preference relation. The average of all such lexicographic rules is shown to satisfy many desirable...

First a non-cooperative model of network formation is investigated where link formation is one-sided and information flow is two-way. For that model, the relationship between different notions of efficient networks is studied: Pareto optimal networks on the one hand and welfare maximizing...