Many conflicts and negotiations can be viewed as a dynamic game, where parties have no commitment power. In our model …, a potential aggressor demands concessions from the weaker party by threatening a war. The absence of commitment makes a … continuous stream of transfers a more effective appeasement strategy than a lump sum transfer. Based on such a strategy, it is …

Many conflicts and negotiations can be viewed as dynamic games in which parties have no commitment power. In our model …, a potential aggressor demands concessions from a weaker party by threatening war. The absence of commitment makes a … continuous stream of transfers a more effective appeasement strategy than a lump-sum transfer. As long as both sides have …

Many conflicts and negotiations can be viewed as a dynamic game, where parties have no commitment power. In our model …, a potential aggressor demands concessions from the weaker party by threatening a war. The absence of commitment makes a … continuous stream of transfers a more effective appeasement strategy than a lump sum transfer. Based on such a strategy, it is …