The present paper examines the stability of self-enforcing International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) among … environmental damage functions and assume k types of countries that differ in their sensitivity to the global pollutant. We find …

This paper examines the stability of International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) in an economy with trade. We extent … policies is essential in enhancing cooperation. Contrary to the IEA model, stable agreements are larger and more efficient in …

This paper examines the stability of International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) in an economy with trade. We extent … policies is essential in enhancing cooperation. Contrary to the IEA model, stable agreements are larger and more efficient in …

We reassess the well-known “narrow-but-deep” versus “broad-but-shallow” trade-off in international environmental … agreements (IEAs), taking into account the principal-agent relationship induced by the hierarchical structure of international … agreements in the weak delegation game, while in the strong delegation game the first-best from the principals’ point of view can …

This paper analyses, within a standard International Environmental Agreement game, the effect of the introduction of …