We present a model in which a motivator can take costly actions - or what we call motivational effort - in order to reduce the effort costs of a worker, and analyze the optimal combination of motivational effort and monetary incentives. We distinguish two cases. First, the firm owner chooses the...

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The main purpose of this project is to examine the liquidity and activity in the secondary market for Norwegian debt securities. The second objective is to determine whether the activity and data availability is sufficient to construct indicators that can be used to monitor the state of...

This paper expands our understanding of possible specialization effects of extended parental leave policies. Identification is based on the introduction of the Cash-for-Care program in Norway in 1998, which increased mothers’ incentives to withdraw from the labor market when their child was...

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When a worker is offered performance related pay, the incentive effect is not only determined by the shape of the incentive contract, but also by the probability of contract enforcement. We show that weaker enforcement may reduce the worker's effort, but lead to higher-powered incentive...

We experimentally investigate to what extent people trust and honor trust when they are playing with other people's money. We adopt the well-known trust game by Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995), with the important difference that the trustor (sender) who sends money to the trustee (receiver)...

We analyze optimal incentive contracts in a model where the probability of court enforcement is determined by the costs spent on contracting. The analysis shows that contract costs matter for incentive provision, both in static spot contracts and repeated game relational contracts. We show that...