We generalize the Shapley-Shubik market model for indivisible goods by considering the case where agents need middlemen to exchange their indivisible goods. In this model, there always exist competitive equilibria in which transaction takes place directly between sellers and buyers or indirectly...

We address the converse of a Wald–Vorob'ev theorem. In a non cooperative game, if the strategy set of any individual player is precompact, we show that the strategy sets of all the other players is precompact.

The note consists of showing the marginal rates of substitution (MRS) explicitly in Nash's product formula and contract curve given by the Jacobian determinant, which otherwise are contained therein only implicitly. Two simple examples from duopoly and bilateral monopoly are used to show the...

We study the pricing and hedging problem of a claim ψ whose payoff depends on the default times of two firms A and B. Thus, regarding the possible defaults of these two firms and assuming that, in the market, we can not buy or sell any defaultable bond of the firm B but only trade defaultable...

In this paper we study the rationing problems in using the issue of Nash implementation in an environment of single-crossing preferences. We show that strict monotonicity (i) implies strict weak no-veto power and unanimity and (ii) is equivalent to Maskin monotonicity, which is vacuously checked...

Playing a bargaining game, the players with non-conforming expectations were trying to enlarge their share of a sugar-pie. The first player, who was not very keen on sweets, placed an emphasis on quality. In contrast, for the second player, all sweet options, whatever they might be, were open....