This paper uses a shock to downside risk in contract enforcement to study lender behavior when collateral enforcement becomes uncertain. I exploit quasi-experimental variation from a shock legal judgement that increased enforcement costs on existing creditors but mechanically left new lenders...

This paper studies how the sale of delinquent debt affects foreclosure and renegotiation. In order to disentangle the effect of loan sale from that of loan quality, I exploit an unanticipated suspension in loan buyouts for GNMA securitized mortgages experiencing a rolling delinquency. I find...

This paper studies how creditors behave under costly collateral enforcement. I exploit quasi-experimental variation in foreclosure costs generated from Maine's 2014 Greenleaf judgement. I estimate that that the foreclosure rate dropped by over 23%. Furthermore, I find that borrowers did not...

This dissertation investigates the role of the secondary market in the enforcement of a creditor's security interest. In the first chapter, I examine how creditors respond to ex-post higher foreclosure costs. I find that when repossessing collateral becomes costly, creditors choose to sell their...