This paper investigates the dynamics of product adoption under incomplete information regarding product quality. A revising agent observes a small sample of actions played in the population and also receives a private signal indicating the realized state. Using a simple heuristic, the agent...

Coordination games admit two types of equilibria: coordinated pure equilibria in which everyone plays the same action, and inefficient mixed equilibria with miscoordination. The existing literature shows that populations will converge to one of the pure coordinated equilibria from almost any...

The hawk-dove game admits two types of equilibria: asymmetric pure equilibria in which players in one population play ‘hawk’ and players in the other population play ‘dove’, and a symmetric mixed equilibrium. The existing literature on dynamic evolutionary models show that populations...

We study population dynamics under which each revising agent tests each strategy k times, with each trial being against a newly drawn opponent, and chooses the strategy whose mean payoff was highest. When k = 1, defection is globally stable in the prisoner's dilemma. By contrast, when k 1 we...