A policymaker selects a group of citizens—a minipublic—to advise her on the desirability of a policy. Each citizen can discover local evidence about the policy but might prefer not to due to political uncertainty in the policymaker’s adoption threshold. Such uncertainty is detrimental to...

When different stages of the evaluation of a multi-attribute project rest with conflicting economic actors, which attributes are selectively explored and why? We provide a model of attribute sampling in which correlation across attributes is flexibly modeled through Gaussian processes. In the...

Can workers from social groups of comparable productivities obtain comparable employment opportunities in the long run? We model dynamic hiring and employer learning via a general Poisson multi-armed bandit framework. Breakdown environments that reveal on-the-job mistakes rather than successes...

Can workers from social groups of comparable productivities obtain comparable employment opportunities in the long run? We model dynamic hiring and employer learning via a general Poisson multi-armed bandit framework. Breakdown environments that reveal on-the-job mistakes rather than successes...

A fully committed sender seeks to sway a collective adoption decision through designing experiments. Voters have correlated payoff states and heterogeneous thresholds of doubt. We characterize the sender-optimal policy under unanimity rule for two persuasion modes. Under general persuasion,...

A fully committed sender seeks to sway a collective adoption decision through designing experiments. Voters have correlated payoff states and heterogeneous thresholds of doubt. We characterize the sender-optimal policy under unanimity rule for two persuasion modes. Under general persuasion,...