This article supplements information on 24 U.S. domestic buyers’ cartels cited in a 2010 book by Blair and Harrison by assembling and analyzing a sample of 49 episodes of buyers’ cartels that have international membership or multi-jurisdictional price effects. It appears that such cartels...

This paper describes the sources and methods used to create the PIC data set, which the author believes to be the largest collection of legal-economic information on contemporary price-fixing cartels. It details the scope, strengths, and limitations of the data therein. Finally, summary...

This comment examines trends in anti-cartel enforcement by the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (the Division) and coordinated actions by other U.S. Government agencies, with particular attention paid to developments in 2017 and 2018. By long-standing DOJ policy, criminal...

This article seeks to answer a fundamental antitrust question: does crime pay? Do the current overall levels of U.S. cartel sanctions adequately discourage firms from engaging in illegal collusion? Seven years ago our research showed that the unfortunate answer was clearly that, yes, criminal...

Closing the loopholes of downstream application of the Capper-Volstead exemption in the food system and pay for delay in pharmaceuticals is an important advance in US and EU antitrust norms. First, pay-for-delay conduct has been harmful for pharmaceuticals customers. After ten years of...

Empirical studies of serial collusion and recidivism in business conduct are rare. The purposes of this paper are to identify and assess alternative measures of serial collusion by price-fixing cartelists and to examine the relationship of serial collusion to the effectiveness of cartels. Two...

Empirical examinations into the determinants of cartel overcharges are limited in the economic literature on collusion. We review the literature and perform a meta-analysis model of overcharges using data on 112 contemporary, penalized bid-rigging episodes over 27 years. We find that the price...

This paper describes some major trends in cartelization of markets worldwide with a special emphasis on the economic injuries being generated by illegal collusion. Known affected commerce by international cartels discovered during 1990-2014 exceeds a nominal $13.6 trillion worldwide. Projections...

In this journal, James Langenfeld critically reviewed four of the present authors' articles that analyze the size of cartel overcharges and their antitrust policy implications. In this comment, we explain why we believe Langenfeld errs in his criticism of our work. In particular, this comment...