Supervisors frequently use formal enforcement tools to intervene in banks’ financial reporting. However, when managers exercise their discretion within the boundaries of accounting rules, supervisors have to turn to soft and informal actions to nudge, rather than force banks to change their...

This paper examines how a regulatory design with multiple supervisory agencies translates into firm-level compliance in form and substance with disclosure regulations. We exploit the fact that banks are subject to equivalent risk disclosure rules under securities laws (IFRS 7) and banking...

We examine how the presence of multiple supervisory agencies affects firm-level compliance in form and substance with disclosure regulations. This analysis is important because coordination problems among regulators are frequently present in practice but often overlooked in academic research. We...

We examine how the presence of multiple supervisory agencies affects firm‐level compliance in form and substance with disclosure regulations. This analysis is important because coordination problems among regulators are frequently present in practice but often overlooked in academic research....

We examine whether higher accounting comparability between public and private firms facilitates the valuation of private firms and, in particular, impacts the value relevance of private firms' financial reporting in M&A transactions. To help develop our hypotheses, we conduct a series of...

We exploit cross-country variation in banks’ confidential reporting requirements under COREP, the common European supervisory risk reporting framework, as an indicator for banking supervisors’ preference for private information. Our results suggest that a stronger preference for confidential...