In a model of simultaneous voting, Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) consider the possibility that jurors vote strategically, rather than sincerely reflecting their individual information. This results in the counterintuitive result that a jury is more likely to convict the innocent under a...

In a model of simultaneous voting, Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) consider the possibility that jurors vote strategically, rather than sincerely reflecting their individual information. This results in the counterintuitive result that a jury is more likely to convict the innocent under a...

One technique employed by budget-conscious researchers is to pay only some subjects for their choices in an experiment, or pay smaller stakes to all subjects. We test the effect of paying some subjects versus paying all subjects in the context of risk preferences, controlling for the difference...

One technique employed by budget-conscious researchers is to pay only some of the subjects for their choices in an experiment. We test the effect of paying some subjects versus paying all subjects in the context of risk preferences, controlling for the difference in stakes induced by paying only...

One technique employed by budget-conscious researchers is to pay only some of the subjects for their choices in an experiment. We test the effect of paying some subjects versus paying all subjects in the context of risk preferences, controlling for the difference in stakes induced by paying only...

Multiperiod models of criminal enforcement based on the standard economic approach of Becker (1968) generally find that the optimal penalty structure is either flat or declining. We present the first experimental test of a two‐stage theoretical model that predicts decreasing penalty structures...

Increasing penalty structures for repeat offenses are ubiquitous in penal codes, despite little empirical or theoretical support. Multi-period models of criminal enforcement based on the standard economic approach of Becker (1968) generally find that the optimal penalty structure is either flat...

Increasing penalty structures for repeat offenses are ubiquitous in penal codes, despite little empirical or theoretical support. Multi-period models of criminal enforcement based on the standard economic approach of Becker (1968) generally find that the optimal penalty structure is either flat...