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When choosing is painful : anticipated regret and psychological opportunity cost

Gabillon, Emmanuelle - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 178 (2020), pp. 644-659

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012439136

On measurement the efficiency of monetary policy

Briec, Walter; Gabillon, Emmanuelle; Ratsimbanierana, … - 2011

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009011215

On measuring the efficiency of monetary policy

Briec, Walter; Gabillon, Emmanuelle; Laselle, Laurence; … - In: Economics letters 117 (2012) 1, pp. 182-185

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009697853

Corporate risk management and information disclosure

Gabillon, Emmanuelle; Gabillon, Jean-Claude - In: Finance : revue de l'Association Française de Finance 33 (2012) 2, pp. 101-128

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009713375

One theory for two different risk premia

Gabillon, Emmanuelle - In: Economics letters 116 (2012) 2, pp. 157-160

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009674510

The benefits of central bank's political independence

Gabillon, Emmanuelle; Martimort, David - In: European economic review : EER 48 (2004) 2, pp. 353-378

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001972241

Structure financière optimale et sensibilité informationnelle des titres

Gabillon, Emmanuelle - In: Annales d'économie et de statistique (2000), pp. 57-99

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001536205

Optimal regulation of a fully insured deposit banking system

Freixas, Xavier; Gabillon, Emmanuelle - In: Journal of regulatory economics 16 (1999) 2, pp. 111-134

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001424942

The Benefits of Central Bank's Political Independence.

Gabillon, E.; Martimort, D. - Groupe de Recherche en Économie Mathématique et … - 1999

This paper analyzes the relationship between a central banker and his partisan political principals. Incentive contracts for central bankers are not designed by social planners but by partisan political principals who obey to their own incentives.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005486535

Optimal Regulation of a Fully Insured Deposit Banking System.

Freixas, X.; Gabillon, E. - Groupe de Recherche en Économie Mathématique et … - 1998

We analyze risk sensitive incentive compatible deposit insurance in the presence of private information when the market value of deposit insurance can be determined using Merton's (1977, 3-11) formula.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005486537

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