I study a dynamic model of consumer privacy and platform data collection. In each period, consumers choose their level of platform activity. Greater activity generates more information about the consumer, thereby increasing platform profits. When the platform can commit to the future privacy...

We study competition for consumer attention, in which platforms can sacrifice service quality for attention. A platform can choose the "addictiveness" of its service. A more addictive platform yields consumers a lower utility of participation but a higher marginal utility of allocating...

A seller faces a consumer with an uncertain value for the product. The seller has imperfect private information about the value and requests additional data to set the price. The consumer can decline any request. The consumer's willingness to provide data depends on his belief about the seller's...

We study competition for consumer attention, in which platforms can sacrifice service quality for attention. A platform can choose the "addictiveness" of its service. A more addictive platform yields consumers a lower utility of participation but a higher marginal utility of allocating...

I study a dynamic model of consumer privacy and platform data collection. In each period, consumers choose their level of platform activity. Greater activity generates more information about the consumer, thereby increasing platform profits. When the platform can commit to the future privacy...

Citizens may engage in crime, depending on the probability of being searched and their types such as legal earning opportunities. Police observes information about citizens' types and allocates search efforts to catch citizens who commit crimes. I show that the police who has full information...

A sender designs an experiment that generates a signal about an uncertain binary state, and then interprets the realized signal. The receiver adopts the sender’s interpretation if the signal is more likely under the proposed interpretation than under the true experiment. Using a...

A seller faces a pool of potential bidders that changes over time. She can delaythe auction to have a thicker market later on. The seller imposes static distortions(through her choice of reserve prices) and dynamic distortions (through her choiceof market thickness). Under a condition on types...