We consider an incomplete contracting model in which the decision process consists of the project choice and execution effort. Each party has an imperfectly informative private signal on the promising project and successful execution requires the agent's effort. Revelation of the principal's...

We consider a relational contracting model in which the parties choose to allocate authority either to the principal (centralization) or to the agent (delegation). The party who has authority chooses a project, and the agent exerts effort to successfully execute the project. Delegation generates...

We investigate a firm's pre-emptive behavior by comparing Cournot competition and Stackelberg games with one leader and multiple followers, where each firm has access to private information on stochastic demand. We show that the firm prefers pre-emptive quantity choice (Stackelberg leader) to...

This study investigates the role of exclusive content provision in two-sided markets where both sides are allowed to join multiple platforms. We consider a model of duopolistic two-sided platform market with a monopolistic multi-product (content) firm on one side, and consumers on the other. The...

We study political competition among parties with policy-motivated candidates and demonstrate two-party competition where one of them has no chance of winning in the general election. If there are multiple candidates in a party, then the party can nominate the representative contingent on who...

This paper examines vertical relationships in which a monopolistic upstream producer supplies a product through downstream distributors to consumers who may access multiple distributors (i.e., multi-homing). Given that there are multi-homing consumers, exclusive supply of a product induces more...

We investigate job design problems in relational contracting environments with multitasking and an aggregated and distorted performance measurement. Compared to assigning all the tasks to a single agent, assigning the tasks to multiple agents mitigates misallocation of effort among the tasks but...

We consider relational contracts for teams in which the agents monitor each other. We demonstrate that providing rents to the agents strengthens peer sanction endowed within the agents' ongoing relationship, which may have a negative effect to induce unproductive collusion as well as a positive...