We study the implications of pre-play wage proposals and information revelation in a labour relationship both theoretically and experimentally. In the baseline model the employer makes a wage offer to the worker who may then accept or reject it. In a subsequent treatment, workers, moving first,...

Pre-play non-binding communication in organizations is prevalent. We study the implications of pre-play wage proposals and information revelation in a labour relationship in a laboratory experiment. In the baseline, that depicts a typical labour market interaction, the employer makes a wage...

The implications of (public or private) pre-play communication and information revelation in a labour relationship is not well understood. We address these implications theoretically and experimentally. In our baseline experiments, the employer offers a wage to the worker who may then accept or...

The main purpose of this paper is to shed some light on the voting behavior of low-income voters over income redistribution. To this end, we test a model based on Meltzer and Richard's (1981) framework through a lab experiment in which individuals vote over two exogenous tax rates and their...

We test for the construct validity of the cognitive reflection test (CRT) by eliciting response times. We find that incorrect answers to the CRT are quicker than correct answers. At the individual level, we classify subjects into impulsive and reflective, depending on whether they choose the...