This dissertation contains three essays in industrial organization. Chapter 1 studies monopoly pricing in a situation of two-sided asymmetric information. In each perfect Bayesian equilibrium that survives the D1 criterion, the price must fully reveal the monopolist's private information. Public...

Chapter 1 studies monopoly pricing in a situation of two-sided asymmetric information. In each perfect Bayesian equilibrium that survives the D1 criterion, the price must fully reveal the monopolist's private information. Public information is shown to reduce the cost of this price signaling by...

Chapter 2 examines whether a position in a search list (e.g. on a sales platform) can signal the quality of an experience good, if firms are allowed to pay for it. We show that it can do so, if vertical differentiation between firms is high, while it cannot, if it is low. Intuitively, if...

Chapter 3 deals with peer-to-peer platforms. There, participants can trade among each other via a platform specific currency, and price setting is often restricted to some extent. We model such platforms as pure exchange economies and characterize all fixed price equilibria. We discuss the...