In many practical contexts where a number of agents have to find a common decision, the votes do not come all together at the same time. In such situations, we may want to preprocess the information given by the subelectorate (consisting of the voters who have expressed their votes) so as to...

In voting contexts, some new candidates may show up in the course of the process. In this case, we may want to determine which of the initial candidates are possible winners, given that a fixed number k of new candidates will be added. We give a computational study of this problem, focusing on...

Multiagent resource allocation is a timely and exciting area of research at the interface of Computer Science and Eco- nomics. One of the main challenges in this area is the high complexity of negotiation. In particular, the complexity of the task of identifying rational deals, i.e. deals that...

Multiagent resource allocation is a timely and exciting area of research at the interface of Computer Science and Eco- nomics. One of the main challenges in this area is the high complexity of negotiation. In particular, the complexity of the task of identifying rational deals, i.e. deals that...

When rational but myopic agents negotiate over the exchange of indivisible resources, any restriction to the negotiation protocol may prevent the system from converging to a socially optimal allocation in the general case. This paper addresses this issue by analysing how the confinement to...