Why do modern organizations have middle managers? We address this question by analyzing the following hierarchical communication model. A subordinate has private information regarding the profitability of a new project and sends a costly signal about it (e.g., technical reports). Although the...

We consider games where an analyst is not confident about players' true information structure for payoff-relevant parameters. We define a robust prediction by a set of action profiles such that, given any information structure among the players, there is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium given that...

We consider an incomplete contracting model in which the decision process consists of the project choice and execution effort. Each party has an imperfectly informative private signal on the promising project and successful execution requires the agent's effort. Revelation of the principal's...

This paper investigates the relationship between media manipulation, the strategic suppression of relevant information by mass media, and self-mediatization, the strategic exploitation of media coverage by candidates, in elections. In the model, a voter cannot directly observe the policies...

This paper studies equilibrium selection in persuasion games where the receiver's actions are binary, and discusses how to justify the most informative equilibrium as a reasonable consequence. In general, there exist multiple equilibria in this environment even if the sender's private...

We consider a sequential entry model with three candidates who cannot commit to any policy announcement during the campaign. The study focuses on how a minor candidate, who wins only when unopposed, influences the electoral outcome. We show that unless the Condorcet winner (i.e., the winner in...

We consider a cheap-talk game a la Crawford and Sobel (1982), where the sender's bias parameter is only “approximately common knowledge” in the sense of (a variant of) Monderer and Samet (1989). Compared to the standard case where the structure of the bias parameter is common knowledge,...