Using a sample of more than 1,500 US public firms in the period 1998-2016, we examine how firms endogenously adjust CEO compensation contracts when they become financially distressed. The link between compensation and equity-based measures of firm performance is positive and strong prior to...

This paper examines the impact of staggered boards on the value of voting rights (i.e., voting premium) estimated using option prices. We find companies with staggered boards have higher voting premium. Exploiting plausibly exogenous court rulings, we confirm that weakening the effectiveness of...

Firms with higher (lower) vote values have significantly lower (higher) future returns. Constructing portfolios based on an option-based measure of the value of voting rights yields average return spreads of about 80 basis points per month, and the return differences persist up to ten months....

Contrary to the entrenchment view of executive compensation, I find that CEOs with more control over the firm, proxied by higher equity ownership, have smaller compensation packages and are less likely to have severance contracts. Despite lower pay, these CEOs have longer tenure and their...

We examine the influence of common ownership on commonalities in the information environment. Specifically, we study commonalities in financial statements and in the actions of key agents such as financial analysts and firm managers who contribute and respond to the information environment....