Employees performing everyday tasks frequently acquire valuable new ideas and knowledge. Our formal analysis studies how organizations can benefit from employee-driven innovation by using incentives to overcome strategic risk from opportunism and governance. We use a game theory framework to...

We analyze a dynamic principal-agent problem with moral hazard and private learning. Each period the agent faces a choice between two actions: a safe action with known returns (exploitation) and a costly risky action with unknown returns (experimentation). We explicitly characterize the cheapest...

I study the characterization of delay aversion in a general class of intertemporal utility functions by adapting the behavioral definition introduced by Benoit and Ok (2007). I show that when the utility functions are partially differentiable, an agent is more delay averse if and only if he has...

I study the characterization of delay aversion in a general class of intertemporal utility functions by adapting the behavioral definition introduced by Benoit and Ok (2007). I show that when the utility functions are partially differentiable, an agent is more delay averse if and only if he has...