We consider transferable utility cooperative games with infinitely many players and the core understood in the space of bounded additive set functions. We show that, if a game is bounded below, then its core is non-empty if and only if the game is balanced. This finding generalizes Schmeidler...

We consider transferable utility cooperative games with infinitely many players. In particular, we generalize the notions of core and balancedness, and also the Bondareva–Shapley Theorem for infinite TU games with and without restricted cooperation, to the cases where the core consists of...

Taking advantage of ambiguity in strategic situations is well documented in the literature. However, so far there are only few results on how to make ambiguous strategies. In this paper we introduce a procedure which makes objective ambiguity, concretely it draws an element from a set of priors,...

Cikkünkben áttekintjük a pontatlan valószínűség (ambiguity) fogalmát. Egy motiváló, jól ismert példától, az Ellsberg-paradoxontól (Ellsberg, 1961) indulunk, és két alapmodellt (Schmeidler, 1989 ésGilboa és Schmeidler, 1989) ismertetünk. Egy rövid fejezetben az alkalmazások...

The seminal no betting theorem on the equivalence of common priors and absence of agreeable bets obtains only over compact state spaces. We show here that this equivalence can be generalised to any infinite space if we expand the set of priors to include probability charges as priors. Going...

The seminal no betting theorem on the equivalence of common priors and absence of agreeable bets obtains only over compact state spaces. We show here that this equivalence can be generalised to any infinite space if we expand the set of priors to include probability charges as priors. Going...