We conduct a randomized field experiment (RFE) to assess whether startup firms perceive accounting expertise as an important investor credential. We send 13,358 unsolicited and unique emails to active startup firms across the US, showing an interest in them with a proposition to meet a bogus...

The prevailing agency theory framework in executive compensation studies highlights the conflict of interest between managers and shareholders. Our study extends the literature by examining the incorporation of debt-related performance metrics (DPMs), such as credit ratings and debt-to-EBITDA...

Exchanges and index providers increasingly push firms to equalize shareholder voting rights. We explore the potential harm arising from dual-class structures by studying the identity and returns of minority shareholders. First, we find that sophisticated investors disproportionately own...

We use the audit industry in China as a laboratory to examine the role of control right allocation on individual auditors’ incentives when balancing coordination and local information acquisition. Relying on proprietary information of internal control right allocations, our tests reveal that...