This paper examines the effects of spectrum auctions on mobile market competition. A simple theoretical model suggests that bigger incumbents will acquire more spectrum in auction to preempt after-market competitors. We use novel data from European 4G spectrum auctions to present suggestive...

This paper examines the effects of spectrum auctions on mobile market competition. A simple theoretical model suggests that bigger incumbents will acquire more spectrum in auction to pre-empt after-market competitors. We use novel data from European 4G spectrum auctions to present suggestive...

We study the design of auctions for the allocation of essential inputs, such as spectrum rights, transmission capacity or airport landing slots, to firms using these inputs to compete in a downstream market. When welfare matters in addition to auction revenues, there is a tradeoff: provisions...

Internet abuse has become a costly, never-ending, game between entities seeking to exploit consumer vulnerability to misleading advertising and warnings. The abusive activity occurs on platforms, such as Windows or OSX operating systems and search engines such as Google and Bing, whose value is...

This paper takes an axiomatic approach to determining “Fair, Reasonable, and Non Discriminatory” (“FRAND”) royalties for intellectual property (“IP”) rights. Drawing on the extensive game theory literature on “surplus sharing/cost sharing” problems, I describe specific formulas...