This paper studies an information hierarchy among players in a competitive context. The hierarchy specifies a player's observation of her opponents' types, which measure their competitiveness: the higher the player is ranked in the hierarchy, the more types she observes. The players then decide...

This study employs a finitely repeated binary investment (trust) experiment to examine the exogenous gradualism mechanism-increasing the investment stake slowly rather than imposing a high stake immediately-in trustor-trustee cooperation building. We propose a behavioral model with reciprocal...

This paper studies a novel game-theoretic setting: players may acquire new actions over time by observing the opponent’s play. We model this scenario as finitely repeated games where players’ action sets are private information and may endogenously expand over time. Three main implications...

Motivated by the ever-increasing prevalence of agile teams, we study a team incentive design problem where multiple agents are located on a network and work on a joint project. The principal seeks the least costly mechanism to incentivize full efforts, by choosing the work assignment sequence...