We propose and analyze an equilibrium model of money management in which the asset allocation decisions of money managers affect the production decisions of firms. The model produces two main results. First, comparing the performance of money managers to that of the overall market portfolio...

We show that firms may benefit from allowing some earnings management, because it can make noisy signals more informative. We model a firm that cannot observe a manager's cost of effort, her effort choice, and whether she manipulated a publicly observable signal. An optimal contract links...

We study a model in which an issuer can manipulate information obtained by a credit rating agency (CRA). Better CRA screening reduces the likelihood of a high rating, but increases the value of a rated security. We find that improving the prior quality of assets can have no effect on the quality...

This paper investigates whether activist investors' focus on short-term stock prices impedes their role in improving corporate governance. The model builds on the notion that both the act of intervention and the threat of an intervention can generate value for the target firm. While the effect...

Complex investments are investments that are difficult to value in the short-term. In this paper, we analyze the incentives of a manager who is compensated based on short-term stock prices to invest in complex long-term investments. In particular, we explore how the manager's investment decision...

This paper develops a dynamic rational expectations model of the credit rating process, incorporating three critical elements of this industry: (i) the rating agencies' ability to misreport the issuer's credit quality, (ii) their ability to issue unsolicited ratings, and (iii) their reputational...