This paper examines the competition of nonprofit sickness funds in the market for supplementary health insurance. We investigate product quality strategies when quality is costly and the sickness funds are competing for customers. As long as the sickness funds choose the qualities for...

This paper examines the competition of nonprofit sickness funds in the market for supplementary health insurance. We investigate product quality strategies when quality is costly and the sickness funds are competing for customers. As long as the sickness funds choose the qualities for...

This paper examines the competition of nonprofit sickness funds in the market for supplementary health insurance. We investigate product quality strategies when quality is costly and the sickness funds are competing for customers. As long as the sickness funds choose the qualities for...

Using a vertical differentiation model, we investigate the product quality strategiesof two competing firms maximizing market shares. The rms are facing variable costs ofquality improvement and choose their prices under the constraint of nonnegative prots.We show that in equilibrium there is no...

Using a vertical differentiation model, we investigate the product quality strategies of two competing firms maximizing market shares. The firms are facing variable costs of quality improvement and choose their prices under the constraint of nonnegative profits. We show that in equilibrium there...

In vertically differentiated repair markets with insured customers, insurance coverage increases price level, entry, and the high quality provider’s profits. In the market for pharmaceuticals, this should be taken into account when calculating the extent of patent periods.