We use an adverse selection model to study the dynamics of firms reputations when firms implement joint projects. We show that in contrast with projects implemented by a single firm, in the case of joint projects a firm's reputation does not necessarily increase following a success and does not...

I analyze a simple model of hold-up with asymmetric information at the contracting stage. I show that contractual signalling and efficiency of investment can conflict if only quantity is contractible. This is because contracted quantity encourages investment in the relationship but also signals...

We examine the impact of agreements that prohibit superstars from switching their services to rivals on firms' ability to collude. Exclusivity (or non-compete) clauses are not uncommon in the sports, entertainment and professional services industries, but courts often refrain from enforcing them...

We highlight a novel trade-off with the use of break-up fees in employment contracts in the presence of firm-specific matching gains and asymmetric learning about workers' quality. If the market infers the workers' quality from job-assignments (or, "promotions"), it leads to inefficiently few...

We study a model of financial advice where investors rely on a financial expert (the advisor) to make their asset allocation choices. There is only one source of risk and the advisor is privately informed about the volatility of the return of the risky asset. Moreover, the advisor’s...