This note reflects on the key parameter of the popular logistic quantal-response equilibrium in order to set some common guidelines on its empirical interpretation. It is stressed that the estimated model must be in harmony with the experimental design, because the estimation results on mu prove...

Three well‐known matching mechanisms designed to solve the college admissions problems are analyzed in the experimental laboratory in different informational settings. We observe that when the level of information is significantly increased, the proportion of schools and teachers that submit...

We test the empirical effectiveness of threats in equilibrating bargaining power in simple bilateral bargaining games. Our experimental design is based on the two-player versions of the multibidding game (Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein, 2001) and the bid-and-propose game (Navarro and Perea,...

This paper proposes a mechanism that can be operated without money in situations where agents have to decide over some common projects when they are not informed about others' preferences. The success of the mechanisms proposed in the literature to deal with similar problems usually relies on...