We study a simple bargaining model in which the sender can make early offers to the receiver. Initially, the sender has private information about the value of the receiver’s outside option. The receiver learns this value before she chooses between the sender’s early offer and her outside...

We study a simple bargaining model in which the sender can make early offers to the receiver. Initially, the sender has private information about the value of the receiver’s outside option. The receiver learns this value before she chooses between the sender’s early offer and her outside...

We consider the Salop (1979) model of product differentiation and assume that consumers are uncertain about the qualities and prices of firms' products. They can inspect all products at zero cost. A share of consumers is expectation-based loss averse. For these consumers, a purchase plan, which...

We consider the Salop (1979) model of product differentiation and assume that consumers are uncertain about the qualities and prices of firms’ products. They can inspect all products at zero cost. A share of consumers is expectation-based loss averse. For these consumers, a purchase plan,...

We consider the Salop (1979) model of product differentiation and assume that consumers are uncertain about the qualities and prices of firms’ products. They can inspect all products at zero cost. A share of consumers is expectation-based loss averse. For these consumers, a purchase plan,...

We consider a model of Bertrand competition where consumers are uncertain about the qualities and prices of firms' products. Consumers can inspect all products at zero cost. A share of consumers is expectation-based loss averse. For these consumers, a purchase plan, which involves buying...