Upon discovery, both managers and firms incur penalties for misreporting. We study the effects of these penalties on financial reporting quality and the cost of capital in a model featuring a manipulating manager, a monitoring board, and a competitive capital market. Corporate penalties have two...

We develop an economic theory on the endogenous relationship between corporate disclosure and shareholder litigation and derive three key results. (i) Decreasing litigation risk can lead to more or less disclosure due a trade-off between the deterrence and the insurance effects of litigation....

While internal control over financial reporting has gained increasing regulatory attention, its enforcement is far from perfect; thus firm-specific incentives to management become important to increase the quality of financial reports. We study how owners can motivate managers to invest in...

Dieses Lehrbuch befasst sich mit der konzeptionellen Gestaltung und den Einsatzbedingungen von Rechnungs- und Informationssystemen im Unternehmen. Themen sind Methoden und Instrumente der Kosten- und Leistungsrechnung, des Kostenmanagement und des Controlling. Das Buch stellt drei...