We analyze the role of resource transfers for peace to hold in equilibrium in a conflict between a single party and an alliance of two parties, motivated by the historical examples of the Crusades and the Balkan Wars. The conflict concerns the resources that belong to the single party. The...

We study the possibility of peace when two countries fight a war over the ownership of a resource. War is always the outcome of the game played by rational countries - under complete or asymmetric information - when there is no pre-established distribution of the resource among countries. When...

We generalize the Tullock Contest Success Function to allow for ties by introducing a tie-proneness parameter to account for the degree of the importance of ties in the contest. The probability of a tie reaches a maximum when the contestants provide similar efforts and it is increasing in the...

In this paper we study mediation when two countries might fight a war over the ownership of a resource. Under complete information mediation is always successful, but a little bit of asymmetric information or some imperfect observability may render mediation impossible