We consider a basic stochastic evolutionary model with rare mutation and a best-reply (or better-reply) selection … information, the best-reply dynamic converges to a Nash equilibrium almost surely. Moreover, only Nash equilibria can be … ; backward induction equilibrium ; Nash equilibrium components ; best-reply dynamics …

We consider a basic stochastic evolutionary model with rare mutation and a best-reply (or better-reply) selection … information, the best-reply dynamic converges to a Nash equilibrium almost surely. Moreover, only Nash equilibria can be …

best reply to their fellows. The terms of cooperation are set by a social contract, which coordinates choices to achieve a …

Potential based no-regret dynamics are shown to be related to fictitious play. Roughly, these are epsilon-best reply …

. For such games we show that best reply improvement paths can be used to approximate equilibria arbitrarily closely. …

equilibrium are eliminated by the replicator dynamics and the best-reply dynamics. …

Potential based no-regret dynamics are shown to be related to fictitious play. Roughly, these are epsilon-best reply …

type of games without invoking the potential function or the finite best-reply property. …