Previous experimental studies have shown that centralized management that a legitimate enforcer implements can be effective in improving cooperation in social dilemmas. The current study examines whether the presence of peer punishment opportunities, especially the chance of retaliating the...

Previous experimental studies have shown that centralized management that a legitimate enforcer implements can be effective in improving cooperation in social dilemmas. The current study examines whether the presence of peer punishment opportunities, especially the chance of retaliating the...

I develop a model of (individually rational) collective reality denial in groups, organizations and markets. Whether participants' tendencies toward wishful thinking reinforce or dampen each other is shown to hinge on a simple and novel mechanism. When an agent can expect to benefit from other's...

We study a dynamic model of environmental protection in which the level of pollution is a state variable that strategically links policy making periods. Policymakers are forward looking but politically motivated: they have heterogeneous preferences and do not fully internalize the cost of...

We study the effects of group identity on cooperation in experimental two-person strategic games. Our results show that in games of strategic complements, group identity only matters initially when a participant interacts with another participant of the same group by delivering more cooperative...

Using a repeated public goods game, we experimentally examine how apologies support mutual cooperation in groups. In two treatments where participants can send either public apologies or private apologies, contributions increase by 0.37 and 0.61 standard deviations respectively, compared to a...