EconBiz - Find Economic Literature
    • Logout
    • Change account settings
  • A-Z
  • Beta
  • About EconBiz
  • News
  • Thesaurus (STW)
  • Research Skills
  • Help
  •  My account 
    • Logout
    • Change account settings
  • Login
EconBiz - Find Economic Literature
Publications Events
Search options
Advanced Search history
My EconBiz
Favorites Loans Reservations Fines
    You are here:
  • Home
  • Search: subject:"Largest consistent set"
Narrow search

Narrow search

Year of publication
Subject
All
Largest consistent set 8 Spieltheorie 8 Game theory 7 largest consistent set 6 Farsightedness 4 (Maskin) monotonicity 3 Cautiousness 3 Coalition formation 3 Implementation 3 Koalition 3 Positive spillovers 3 Coalition 2 Cooperative game 2 Core 2 Delay in payments 2 Externalities 2 Externer Effekt 2 Inventory 2 Matching 2 Search theory 2 Spillover-Effekt 2 Suchtheorie 2 coalition formation 2 core 2 farsightedness 2 positive spillovers 2 rights structures 2 Assortative matching 1 Coalitional games 1 Effectiveness function 1 Farsighted stability 1 Farsighted stable set 1 Group contest 1 Inventory model 1 Kooperatives Spiel 1 Lagerhaltungsmodell 1 Lagermanagement 1 Pairwise stable matching 1 Rights structures 1 Spillover effect 1
more ... less ...
Online availability
All
Free 10 Undetermined 3
Type of publication
All
Book / Working Paper 9 Article 5
Type of publication (narrower categories)
All
Working Paper 5 Article in journal 4 Aufsatz in Zeitschrift 4 Arbeitspapier 3 Graue Literatur 3 Non-commercial literature 3
Language
All
English 12 Undetermined 2
Author
All
Korpela, Ville 3 Lombardi, Michele 3 Mauleon, Ana 3 Vartiainen, Hannu 3 Feng, Hairong 2 Imamura, Kenzo 2 Konishi, Hideo 2 Li, Jun 2 Vannetelbosch, Vincent 2 Zeng, Yinlian 2 Ana, MAULEON 1 Bhattacharya, A 1 Kimya, Mert 1 MAULEON, Ana 1 VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent 1 Vannetelbosch, Vincent J. 1 Vincent, VANNETELBOSCH 1
more ... less ...
Institution
All
Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), École des Sciences Économiques de Louvain 1 Department of Economics and Related Studies, University of York 1 Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) 1 Institut de Recherche Économique et Sociale (IRES), École des Sciences Économiques de Louvain 1
Published in...
All
Discussion paper 2 Dynamic games and applications : DGA 2 Boston College working papers in economics 1 CORE Discussion Papers 1 Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) 1 Discussion Papers / Department of Economics and Related Studies, University of York 1 European Journal of Operational Research 1 European journal of operational research : EJOR 1 Games and economic behavior 1 Nota di Lavoro 1 Working Papers / Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) 1 Working paper 1
more ... less ...
Source
All
ECONIS (ZBW) 7 RePEc 5 EconStor 2
Showing 1 - 10 of 14
Cover Image
Coalition formation under dominance invariance
Kimya, Mert - In: Dynamic games and applications : DGA 13 (2023) 2, pp. 480-496
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014327249
Saved in:
Cover Image
Implementation with farsighted agents
Korpela, Ville; Lombardi, Michele; Vartiainen, Hannu - 2021
notion of the largest consistent set. The designer’s exercise consists of designing a rights structure that formalizes the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012503093
Saved in:
Cover Image
Assortative matching with externalities and farsighted agents
Imamura, Kenzo; Konishi, Hideo - 2021
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012805137
Saved in:
Cover Image
Implementation with farsighted agents
Korpela, Ville; Lombardi, Michele; Vartiainen, Hannu - 2021
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012433566
Saved in:
Cover Image
Assortative matching with externalities and farsighted agents
Imamura, Kenzo; Konishi, Hideo - In: Dynamic games and applications : DGA 13 (2023) 2, pp. 497-509
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014327251
Saved in:
Cover Image
Implementation in largest consistent set via rights structures
Korpela, Ville; Lombardi, Michele; Vartiainen, Hannu - In: Games and economic behavior 128 (2021), pp. 202-212
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012672080
Saved in:
Cover Image
Inventory games with permissible delay in payments
Li, Jun; Feng, Hairong; Zeng, Yinlian - In: European journal of operational research : EJOR 234 (2014) 3, pp. 694-700
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010360430
Saved in:
Cover Image
Inventory games with permissible delay in payments
Li, Jun; Feng, Hairong; Zeng, Yinlian - In: European Journal of Operational Research 234 (2014) 3, pp. 694-700
Meca et al. (2004) studied a class of inventory games which arise when a group of retailers who observe demand for a common item decide to cooperate and make joint orders with the EOQ policy. In this paper, we extend their model to the situation where retailer’s delay in payments is permitted...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010738170
Saved in:
Cover Image
Farsightedness and Cautiousness in Coalition Formation
Mauleon, Ana; Vannetelbosch, Vincent - 2003
We adopt the largest consistent set defined by Chwe [J. of Econ. Theory 63 (1994), 299-235] to predict which coalition … to the largest consistent set. The grand coalition, which is the efficient coalition structure, always belongs to the … largest consistent set and is the unique one to belong to the largest cautious consistent set. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011325075
Saved in:
Cover Image
Farsightedness and Cautiousness in Coalition Formation
Ana, MAULEON; Vincent, VANNETELBOSCH - Institut de Recherche Économique et Sociale (IRES), … - 2003
We adopt the largest consistent set defined by Chwe (J. of Econ. Theory 63 (1994, 299-235) to predict which coalition … to the largest consistent set. The grand coalition, which is the efficient coalition structure, always belongs to the … largest consistent set and is the unique one to belong to the largest cautious consistent set. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004985022
Saved in:
  • 1
  • 2
  • Next
  • Last
A service of the
zbw
  • Sitemap
  • Plain language
  • Accessibility
  • Contact us
  • Imprint
  • Privacy

Loading...