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  • Search: subject:"Pirates Organized crime Signalling Reputation"
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Leeson, Peter T. 1
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Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 1
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Pirational choice: The economics of infamous pirate practices
Leeson, Peter T. - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 76 (2010) 3, pp. 497-510
Abstract This paper investigates the economics of infamous pirate practices. Two closely related economic theories--the theory of signaling and the theory of reputation building--explain these practices. First, I examine the pirate flag, "Jolly Roger," which pirates used to signal their identity...
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