Search Results - subject:"Power Indices"

Why Power Indices for Assessing European Union Decision-Making?

Holler, Manfred; Widgrén, Mika - In: Journal of Theoretical Politics 11 (1999) 3, pp. 321-330

power indices do not take into account preferences or the role of the agenda-setter, are not fully valid as spatial voting … games deal with complete whereas power indices deal with incomplete contracts. Ideas for combining the two so far very …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010777899

More Reasons to Resist the Temptation of Power Indices in the European Union

Garrett, Geoffrey; Tsebelis, George - In: Journal of Theoretical Politics 11 (1999) 3, pp. 331-338

. Nonetheless, they go on to argue that power indices are better suited than our analysis to address questions of institutional …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010777920

Why Resist the Temptation to Apply Power Indices to the European Union?

Garrett, Geoffrey; Tsebelis, George - In: Journal of Theoretical Politics 11 (1999) 3, pp. 291-308

The temptation to apply power indices to decision-making in the European Union should be resisted for two reasons … that generate unstable and misleading results. Second, no matter how sophisticated, power indices cannot take into account … research with ingenious efforts to include functional substitutes for institutions and preferences. The problems with power …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010778019

Power Relations in the IMF: A Study of the Political Economy of A Priori Voting Power Using the Theory of Simple Games

Leech, Dennis - Centre for the Study of Globalisation and … - 1998

differ. Power indices are a value concept for majority voting games which provide a means of analysing this difference. This … paper provides new algorithms for computing the two classical power indices (the Banzhaf index and the Shapley-Shubik index … of the power indices. Power relations are studied with respect to two types of decisions: ordinary decisions requiring a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005688629

The Paradox of Coalition Trading

Colomer, Josep M.; Martínez, Florencio - In: Journal of Theoretical Politics 7 (1995) 1, pp. 41-63

We present a model of coalition formation in a multiparty and multiparliament system in which several parties can agree on simultaneously exchanging their votes in a set of parliaments. Given this possibility, a party, acting rationally in its own self-interest, could accept sharing oversized...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011135373

Who Has the Power in the EU?

Barr, Jason; Passarelli, Francesco - Department of Economics, Rutgers University-Newark

The European Union (EU) is facing the challenge of enlargement to almost double its current size. This change has strong implications for the balance of power among member states. Building on the work of Shapley (1977) and Owen (1972), we present a measure of power that is based on players'...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005650278

The Relationship Between Shareholding Concentration and Shareholder Voting Power in British Companies: A Study of the Application of Power Indices for Simple Games

Leech, Dennis - In: Management Science 34 (1988) 4, pp. 509-527

Banzhaf power indices. The results indicate that power is more concentrated than ownership in every case. A comparison of the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009214208