Search Results - subject:"Power of incentives"

Dynamic managerial compensation: On the optimality of seniority-based schemes

Garrett, Daniel; Pavan, Alessandro - 2014

with time and is his private information. We show that, in general, the power of incentives (or "pay for performance") may … power of incentives later in the relationship. Our results follow from a new variational approach that permits us to tackle …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011335456

Dynamic managerial compensation : on the optimality of seniority-based schemes

Garrett, Daniel F.; Pavan, Alessandro - 2014

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010476876

Dynamic Managerial Compensation: On the Optimality of Seniority-based Schemes

Garrett, Daniel; Pavan, Alessandro - Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and … - 2014

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011165973

Contracts Offered by Bureaucrats

Khalil, Fahad; Kim, Doyoung; Lawarrée, Jacques - 2013

We examine the power of incentives in bureaucracies by studying contracts offered by a bureaucrat to her agent. The …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010328763

Contracts offered by bureaucrats

Khalil, Fahad; Kim, Doyoung; Lawarrée, Jacques - 2013

We examine the power of incentives in bureaucracies by studying contracts offered by a bureaucrat to her agent. The …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010212358

Contracts Offered by Bureaucrats

Khalil, Fahad; Kim, Doyoung; Lawarrée, Jacques - CESifo - 2013

We examine the power of incentives in bureaucracies by studying contracts offered by a bureaucrat to her agent. The …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010721605

Are you a Good Employee or Simply a Good Guy? Infl?uence Costs and Contract Design.

Corgnet, Brice; Rodriguez-Lara, Ismael - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2012

We develop a principal-agent model with a moral hazard problem in which the principal has access to a hard signal (the level of output) and a soft signal (the supervision signal) about the agent?s level of effort. We show that the agent?'s ability to manipulate the soft signal increases the cost...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009647550

Strategic incentives for innovations and market competition

Chalioti, Evangelia; Serfes, Konstantinos - In: International journal of industrial organization 52 (2017), pp. 427-449

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011820288

Optimal performance reward, tax compliance and enforcement

Kotsogiannēs, Chrēstos; Serfes, Konstantinos - In: Economic theory bulletin 4 (2016) 2, pp. 325-345

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011641999

Are you a good employee or simply a good guy? : influence costs and contract design

Corgnet, Brice; Rodríguez-Lara, Ismael - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 92 (2013), pp. 259-272

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010198064