dictator game. Finally, independent of the game institution or proposer selection mechanism, promises provide credible signals …

What explains significant variation across countries in the use of vote buying instead of campaign promises to secure … promises, and explores the distributional consequences of this decision, in a setting where party credibility can vary. When … campaign promises. When political credibility is sufficiently low, some voter groups are targeted only with vote buying and not …

dictator game. Finally, independent of the game institution or proposer selection mechanism, promises provide credible signals …

What explains significant variation across countries in the use of vote buying instead of campaign promises to secure … promises, and explores the distributional consequences of this decision, in a setting where party credibility can vary. When … campaign promises. When political credibility is sufficiently low, some voter groups are targeted only with vote buying and not …

present experimental evidence on what motivates people to keep their promises. First, they feel that they are duty-bound to … keep their promises regardless of whether promisees expect them to (promising per se effect). Second, they care about not …

different actions. This illustrates how the pool of voluntary promises can induce redistribution from consumers with high …