In the present paper, a new approach to equilibrium selection for very general normal form games has been constructed by introducing stochastic optimal stopping theory into classical evolutionary game theory. That is, the new game equilibrium is induced by both stochastic group evolution and...

In the present paper, a new approach to equilibrium selection for very general normal form games has been constructed by introducing stochastic optimal stopping theory into classical evolutionary game theory. That is, the new game equilibrium is induced by both stochastic group evolution and...

The causes and effects of technical change are investigated in a multi-sector economy. The underlying modelling framework is a hybrid of Classical economic thinking as introduced by Ricardo (1821) and formalised by Sraffa(1960), and of Evolutionary economics following Schumpeter (1934)and Nelson...

Differently from previous studies of tag-based cooperation, we assume that individuals fail to recognize their own tag. Due to such incomplete information, the action taken against the opponent cannot be based on similarity, although it is still motivated by the tag displayed by the opponent. We...