the employees' compensation, relative to organizations that operate in a more conventional "pay secrecy" regime. Second …-subsidize" weak ones, achieving a more balanced allocation of effort than under pay secrecy. We discuss testable implications of our … model for compensation design, the choice between transparency and secrecy regimes, and organizational responses to pay …

the employees’ compensation, relative to organizations that operate in a more conventional “pay secrecy” regime. Second …-subsidize” weak ones, achieving a more balanced allocation of effort than under pay secrecy. We discuss testable implications of our … model for compensation design, the choice between transparency and secrecy regimes, and organizational responses to pay …

the employees' compensation, relative to organizations that operate in a more conventional "pay secrecy" regime. Second …-subsidize" weak ones, achieving a more balanced allocation of effort than under pay secrecy. We discuss testable implications of our … model for compensation design, the choice between transparency and secrecy regimes, and organizational responses to pay …

the employees' compensation, relative to organizations that operate in a more conventional "pay secrecy" regime. Second …-subsidize" weak ones, achieving a more balanced allocation of effort than under pay secrecy. We discuss testable implications of our … model for compensation design, the choice between transparency and secrecy regimes, and organizational responses to pay …