We study an extended version of a sender-receiver signaling game-a context-signaling (CS) game that involves external contextual cues that provide information about a sender's private information state. A formal evolutionary analysis of the investigated CS game shows that ambiguous signaling...

In the Inverse Set, relative to the Shapley Value of a non-convex cooperative game, we derive a procedure to find out a convex game in which the Egalitarian Allocation is a coalitional rational value. The procedure depends on the relationship between two parameters called the Convexity Threshold...

We are concerned with the stability of partition-allocation pairs in a coalitional game, i.e., a transferable-utility (TU) cooperative game. Our criterion boils down to the impossibility for the current allocation to be Pareto-dominated by any other allocation that might arise from any fission...

Blockchain-based traceability systems of agricultural product supply chains (APSCs) can operate more efficiently and accurately to increase food safety, yet little literature considered that traceability information could still be falsified before stored in the blockchain. Therefore, based on...

In this paper we review, upgrade, and synthesize existing models from evolutionary game theory, all of which aim at explaining human behaviour in the ultimatum game. Our new and improved versions of Gale et al. (1995), Nowak et al. (2000), and Rand et al. (2013) avoid shortcomings that the...

Purpose This research studies the behavior choice of key actors in the construction supply chain and constructs a model which includes the benefit function of the government, contractors and owners, aiming at improving the coverage of green buildings. Design/methodology/approach In this paper,...