I investigate the design of effort-maximizing mechanisms when agents have both private information and convex effort costs, and the designer has a fixed prize budget. I first demonstrate that it is always optimal for the designer to utilize a contest with as many participants as possible....

Information provision experiments have become pivotal in understanding how beliefs influence human behavior in various social science contexts. These experiments, which manipulate the information sets available to respondents, enable the exogenous alteration of beliefs and perceived constraints,...

We develop a sequentially variant Blotto game with one-sided and incomplete information to investigate strategic interactions between a defender and an attacker whose target site values are unknown. The defender first allocates defensive resources before the attacker decides a probability...

This paper provides a general study of a contest modeled as a multiplayer incomplete-information, all-pay auction with sequential entry. The contest consists of multiple periods. Players arrive and exert efforts sequentially to compete for a prize. They observe the efforts made by their earlier...

I study a persuasion game between a privately informed agent and a decision maker (DM) who can imperfectly verify the statements made by the agent by observing a signal that is correlated with the agent's information. I find that whether or not the DM benefits from communicating with the agent...

Quantum advantage in Bayesian games, or games with incomplete information, refers to the larger set of correlated equilibrium outcomes that can be obtained by using quantum mechanisms rather than classical ones. Earlier examples of such advantage go under the title of quantum pseudo-telepathy....