Search Results - subject:"Vickrey auctions."

Experimental auctions, collective induction and choice shift : willingness-to-pay for rice quality in Senegal

Demont, Matty; Rutsaert, Pieter; Ndour, Maïmouna; … - In: European review of agricultural economics : ERAE 40 (2013) 2, pp. 261-286

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009734032

Effect of distance of transportation on willingness to pay for food

Grebitus, Carola; Lusk, Jayson L.; Nayga, Rodolfo M. - In: Ecological Economics 88 (2013) C, pp. 67-75

Consumers' interest in locally produced foods is increasing. Hence, there is a need to decipher and quantify consumers' desire for local foods and understand the underlying causes of this demand. More specifically, we examine in this paper the issue of distance of transportation and its' impact...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010636118

WILLINGNESS TO PAY VERSUS EXPECTED CONSUMPTION VALUE IN VICKREY AUCTIONS FOR NEW EXPERIENCE GOODS

Alfnes, Frode - Agricultural and Applied Economics Association - AAEA - 2006

Vickrey auctions are commonly used to elicit willingness to pay for new food products. This paper shows that in a multi … affect both the expected value of the quality information and the weakly dominant bidding strategy in Vickrey auctions for … new experience goods. Keywords: experience goods, value of information, Vickrey auctions. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005483761

On Ascending Vickrey Auctions for Heterogeneous Objects

Vries, Sven de; Schummer, James - Society for Economic Dynamics - SED - 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005069418

Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations

MISHRA, Debasis; PARKES, David C. - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2005

Ascending price auctions typically involve a single price path with buyers paying their final bid price. Using this traditional definition, no ascending price auction can achieve the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) outcome for general private valuations in the combinatorial auction setting. We relax...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005043169

Collusive dominant-strategy truthfulness

Chen, Jing; Micali, Silvio - In: Journal of Economic Theory 147 (2012) 3, pp. 1300-1312

We show that collusion and wrong beliefs may cause a dramatic efficiency loss in the Vickrey mechanism for auctioning a single good in limited supply. We thus put forward a new mechanism guaranteeing efficiency in a very adversarial collusion model, where the players can partition themselves...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010572370

A near Pareto optimal auction with budget constraints

Hafalir, Isa E.; Ravi, R.; Sayedi, Amin - In: Games and Economic Behavior 74 (2012) 2, pp. 699-708

In a setup where a divisible good is to be allocated to a set of bidders with budget constraints, we introduce a mechanism in the spirit of the Vickrey auction. In the mechanism we propose, understating budgets or values is weakly dominated. Since the revenue is increasing in budgets and values,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049670

Vickrey Auctions with Reserve Pricing

Cramton, Peter; Ausubel, Lawrence M. - University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter … - 2004

We generalize the Vickrey auction to allow for reserve pricing in a multiple item auction with interdependent values. By withholding quantity in some circumstances, the seller can improve revenues or mitigate collusion. In the Vickrey auction with reserve pricing, the seller determines the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004988757

The willingness-to-accept/willingness-to-pay disparity in repeated markets: loss aversion or ‘bad-deal’ aversion?

Isoni, Andrea - In: Theory and Decision 71 (2011) 3, pp. 409-430

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009327406

What Format for Multi-Unit Multiple-Bid Auctions?

Hailu, Atakelty; Thoyer, Sophie - In: Computational Economics 35 (2010) 3, pp. 189-209

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008631213