It is commonly accepted that the multiplicity of equilibria is ubiquitous in preference aggregation games with any voting method. We prove that this multiplicity is greatly reduced under some mild restrictions over social preferences when each voter can vote for as many candidates as she wishes...

If voters vote strategically, is it useful to offer them the possibility of expressing nuanced opinions, or would they always overstate the intensity of their preferences? For additive voting rules, say that a ballot is extremal if it is neither abstention-like nor can be expressed as a mixture...

If voters vote strategically, is it useful to offer them the possibility of expressing nuanced opinions, or would they always overstate the intensity of their preferences? For additive voting rules, say that a ballot is extremal if it is neither abstention-like nor can be expressed as a mixture...

This paper studies the dynamic evolution of an economy in which parents can choose to send their child to a public or private school and vote over taxes used to fund public schools. The objective is to study growth and the evolution of income distribution in a model where alternative education...

This paper studies the dynamic evolution of an economy in which parents can choose to send their child to a public or private school and vote over taxes used to fund public schools. The objective is to study growth and the evolution of income distribution in a model where alternative education...