We present a model of secured credit chains in which assets generated from intermediation activity and pledged as collateral create fragility. A dealer stands between a borrower and a financier. The dealer borrows from the financier to fund her project, subject to a moral hazard problem, In...

We present a model of secured credit chains in which assets generated from intermediation activity and pledged as collateral create fragility. A dealer stands between a borrower and a financier. The dealer borrows from the financier to fund her project, subject to a moral hazard problem, In...

We develop a quantity-driven general equilibrium model that integrates the term structure of interest rates with the repurchase agreements (repo) market to shed light on the combined effects of quantitative easing (QE) on the bond and money markets. We characterize in closed form the endogenous...

We construct the first measure of collateral re-use at the bank and bond level for the European repo market using a regulatory transaction dataset. We show that banks materially increase the rate of re-use in response to tightened asset scarcity induced by the Eurosystem's asset purchase...

This paper studies the drivers of primary dealers' repo activity and the effect of repo market frictions on bond market liquidity. It separates the two tiers of the bond market, the electronic limit order book (LOB) and the over-the-counter (OTC) market. The results, based on dealer-specific...