Search Results - subject:"all pay auctions"

Bos, Olivier - 2008

Recent literature has shown that all-pay auctions raise more money for charity than winner-pay auctions. We demonstrate … that the first and second-price winner-pay auctions generate higher revenue than first-price all-pay auctions when bidders …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264437

All-Pay auctions with negative prize externalities: Theory and experimental evidence

Sacco, Dario; Schmutzler, Armin - 2008

The paper characterizes the mixed-strategy equilibria in all-pay auctions with endogenous prizes that depend positively …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010315592

Charity Auctions for the Happy Few

Bos, Olivier - CESifo - 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005181374

All-pay auctions with certain and uncertain prizes

Minchuk, Yizhaq; Sela, Aner - In: Games and economic behavior 88 (2014), pp. 130-134

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011289482

Contests with productive effort

Siegel, Ron - In: International journal of game theory : official journal … 43 (2014) 3, pp. 515-523

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010379397

All-pay auctions with polynomial rewards

Bos, Olivier; Ranger, Martin - In: Annals of economics and statistics 115/116 (2014), pp. 361-377

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011456492

Crowdsourcing with all-pay auctions : a field experiment on Taskcn

Liu, Tracy Xiao; Yang, Jiang; Adamic, Lada A.; Chen, Yan - In: Management science : journal of the Institute for … 60 (2014) 8, pp. 2020-2037

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010403580

Multi-stage sequential all-pay auctions

Segev, Ella; Sela, Aner - In: European economic review : EER 70 (2014), pp. 371-382

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010498838

An elementary proof of the common maximal bid in asymmetric first-price and all-pay auctions

Fibich, Gadi; Oren, Gal - In: Economics letters 122 (2014) 2, pp. 190-191

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010395194

Contests with productive effort

Siegel, Ron - In: International Journal of Game Theory 43 (2014) 3, pp. 515-523

I consider competitions in which, conditional on winning or losing, the effort exerted by a competitor does not necessarily decrease his payoff. This happens, for example, in competitions for promotions in which workers are intrinsically motivated, and in research and development races in which...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010993377

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