I present a model of intra-household allocation to show that when income is not perfectly observed by both spouses, hiding of income can occur even when revelation increases bargaining power. I draw data from Ghana and exploit the variation in the degree of asymmetric information between...

I present a model of intra-household allocation to show that when income is not perfectly observed by both spouses, hiding of income can occur even when revelation increases bargaining power. I draw data from Ghana and exploit the variation in the degree

We present a simple model of intra-household allocation between spouses to show that when there is asymmetric information over monetary transfers between spouses, the incentives to hide income depend on the role spouses play within the household. We test the model with data from a field...

Following Ben-Porath (1967), the influence of life expectancy on education has attracted much attention. Whereas existing growth models rely on an education decision made either by the child or by his parent, we revisit the Ben-Porath effect when the education is the outcome of a bargaining...

I present a simple model of intra-household allocation between spouses to show that when the quantity of resources available to the household is not perfectly observed by both spouses, hiding of income can occur even when revelation of the additional resources increases bargaining power. From...

This paper develops a model that combines intra-household bargaining with competition on the marriage market to analyse women's and men's incentives to invest in education. Once married, spouses bargain over their share of total household income. They have the option of unilateral divorce and...

I present a simple model of intra-household allocation between spouses to show that when the quantity of resources available to the household is not perfectly observed by both spouses, hiding of income can occur even when revelation of the additional resources increases bargaining power. From...